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Since the OPEC oil embargo of 1973-74, the U.S. Congress has
sought to establish an energy policy that would reduce our nation's
dependence on foreign oil while preserving nonrenewable energy
resources such as petroleum. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act
of 1975, among other things, created a federal regulatory scheme
intended to save oil by compelling vehicle manufacturers to produce
more fuel efficient passenger cars and light trucks. 1 This scheme is
administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), and is known as the Corporate Average Fuel Economy-
(CAFE) program.2
Substantial progress in fuel economy has been achieved. A
combination of regulatory and market pressures induced a doubling in
* This report was supported by a grant from the Centers for Disease Control of the
U.S. Public Health Service to the Harvard Injury Control Center. The author thanks
the following individuals for providing helpful comments and information: Robert
Crandall, Leonard Evans, Michael Finkelstein, Dana Gelb-Safran, David Greene,
H.R. Hackney, Tara Hill, Hans Joksch, Charles Kahane, Orron Kee, Leroy Lindgren,
Adrian Lund, Terry Klein, David Kulp, Patricia Levy, Brian O'Neill, Susan Partyka,
Steve Plotkin, Deborah Servi, Louis Walton, and Tom Wells. The author is
responsible for all errors and conclusions.
** Professor Graham received his B.A. (economics) from Wake Forest University,
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1 Pub. L. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871, at 902. Provisions governing the average fuel
economy standards are codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2002 (198).
2 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. Part 525 (1991). See also, e.g., NHTSA, AUTOMOTIVE
FUELECONOMY PROGRAM (15th Ann. Rpt. to Congress, 1991).
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new car fuel economy from about 14 miles per gallon (MPG) in 1973 to
28 MPG in 1991. The fuel economy of new light trucks, which account
for a growing fraction of new vehicle sales, has increased only slightly
from 18 MPG in 1979 to 21 MPG in 1991. 3
While the supply of gasoline is now plentiful and prices at the pump
are low (about $1.25 per gallon in the U.S.), recent world events have
stimulated Congress to consider new legislation that would revamp and
tighten CAFE standards. The Persian Gulf war raised questions about
whether America had engaged in costly military intervention due to
excessive dependence on Mideast oil. Moreover, a global warming trend
is occurring that could be catastrophic if the U.S. and other nations do
not reduce fossil fuel consumption. Energy conservation is seen by
some policy analysts as a promising measure to address both national
security and environmental concerns.4
Although fuel economy legislation is well intended, concerns have
been raised that overly stringent fuel economy rules could compromise
the safety of motor vehicle occupants.5 Safety concerns are rooted in
the observation that, in the event of a crash, occupants of small cars are
at greater danger of death and serious injury than occupants of large
cars.6 Even when occupants are restrained by belt systems, small car
3 Idt
4 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (OTA), IMPROvING AUTOMOBILE FUEL
ECONOMY: NEW STANDARDS, NEW APPROACHES (1991).
5 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Where is Safety in the Fuel Economy
Debate? Status Report: Highway Loss Reduction, Sept. 8, 1990, at 1.
6 J. KIHLBERG, E. NARRAGON, B. CAMPBELL, AUTOMOBILE CRASH IN]URY IN
RELATION TO CAR SiZE (Cornell Aero. Lab. Rpt. VJ-1823-Rl1, 1964); Campbell,
Driver Injury in Automobile Accidents Involving Certain Car Models, 2 J. SAFETY
RESH. 207 (1970); B.CAMPBELL & D. REINFURT, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DRIVER
CRASH INIRY AND PASSENGER CAR WEIGHT (Hghwy. Safety Resh. Ctr., U. N. Car.
1973); J. O'DAY & R. KAPLAN, How MUCH SAFER ARE YOU IN A LARGE CAR? 5 HIT
Lab Reports, May 1975, at 1; O'Neill, Ginsburg & Robertson, The Effects of
Vehicle Size on Passenger Car Occupant Death Rates (Soc'y Auto. Eng. Tech.
Paper Ser. 770808, 1977); H JOKSCH, INJRY CLAIM RISK IN 1977-79 CARS IN
RELATION TO CAR WEIGHT (Ctr. Envir. and Man 1982).
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occupants incur elevated risks of serious injury and death in crashes. 7
The introduction of air bags into new cars should lessen occupant injury
risk, but preliminary estimates suggest that air bags are less effective in
small cars than in large cars. 8. If fuel economy legislation stimulates
more sales of small cars (or downsized large cars), the number of crash-
related deaths and injuries on the highway may be increased compared
to what would occur without tighter fuel economy legislation.
Safety concerns played surprisingly little role in the public policy
debate until the Bush Administration reversed the position of the Reagan
Administration, which had downplayed the link between fuel economy
regulation and safety.9 One of the reasons for this reversal was
growing recognition of the findings of the first peer-reviewed study of
CAFE and safety, which estimated that 1989 models are 500 pounds
lighter than they would have been without CAFE rules, resulting in a 14
to 27% elevation in the occupant fatality rate in these vehicles. 10
While researchers at the NHTSA were originally skeptical of these
findings, the research they initiated in response ultimately led to similar
qualitative findings. 1 1 Independent research performed by the
7 Jones & Whitfield, The Effects of Restraint Use and Mass in "Downsized" Cars
(Soc'y Auto. Eng. Tech. Paper Ser. 840199, 1984); Evans, Fatality Risk for Belted
Drivers Versus Car Mass, 17 ACCIDENT ANAL& PREY. 251 (1985).
8 HIGHWAY Loss DATA INSTITUTE, DRlvER INJURY EXPERIENCE IN 1990 MODELS
EQUIPPED wrrH AIR BAGS ORAUTOMA'IC BELTS (Insur. Spec. Rpt. A-38, 1991); P.
ZADOR & M. CICCONE, DRIVER FATALITiESIN FRONTAL IMPACTS: COMPARISONS
BEWEEN CARS WITH AIR BAGS AND MANUAL BELTS (Insur. Inst. Hghwy. Safety
1991).
9 Personal communication from S. Kazman of the Competitive Enterprise
Institute, Washington, D.C. (1991).
10 Crandall & Graham, The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on Auto Safety, 32
J. LAW &ECON. 97 (1989).
11 Partyka, Registration-Based Fatality Rates by Car Size from 1978 through
1987, in PAPERS ON CAR SIZE: SAFETY AND TRENDS (NHTSA 1989); Partyka &
Boehly, Passenger Car Weight and Injury Severity in Single Vehicle Nonrollover
Crashes, in THE EFFECT OF CAR SizE ON FATALITY AND INJURY RISK IN SINGLE-
VEHICLE CRASHES 14 (NHTSA 1990); Kahane, Effect of Car Size on the Frequency
and Severity of Rollover Crashes, in THE EFFECT OF CAR SIZE ON FATAITY AND
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Insurance Institute for Highway Safety has raised additional concerns
about the adverse safety consequences of a smaller fleet of vehicles,
especially when the fleet of light trucks, which are aggressive in two-
vehicle crashes, is growing. 12
Not everyone is convinced that ambitious fuel economy legislation
will necessarily compromise vehicle safety. Some analysts have
suggested that major gains in fuel economy can be achieved through
technological improvements that would not compromise occupant
safety. 13 Others have raised important theoretical and empirical
questions about the relationships between vehicle size, vehicle weight,
and the safety of occupants. 14 Some analysts believe that small car
safety can be enhanced through a new round of safety regulation. 15
Meanwhile, a series of new empirical studies have been published that
shed additional light on the relative safety of small cars. 16
INJURY RISKINSINGLE-VEHICLE CRASHES 28 (NHTSA 1990); T. KLEIN, E. HERTZ, &
S. BORENER, A COLLECTION OF RECENT ANALYSES OF VEHICLE WEIGHT AND SAFETY
(NHTSA 1991).
12 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Small-Car Deaths, Injuries Worst;
Models Vary Greatly, Status Report: Highway Loss Reduction, Dec. 30, 1982, at 1;
Where is Safety, supra note 5; Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Comparison
Shows Downsizing Plays a Dramatic Role in Occupant Death Rates, Status Report:
Highway Loss Reduction, Mar. 16, 1991, at 4.
13 NHTSA, supra note 2.
14 Testimony from J. D. Khazzoom on Reauthorization of the NHTSA before
Senate Consumer Subcomm., Comm. Commerce, Science & Transportation, (Apr.
11, 1991, transcript) OTA, supra note 4; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO),
HIGHWAY SAFETY: HAVE AUTOMOBILE WEIGHT REDUCTIONS INCREASED HIGHWAY
FATALrIES? (1991).
15 CENTERFOR Auro SAFETY, THE SAFE ROADTOFUELECONOMY (1991).
16 Partyka, supra note 11; Partyka & Boehly, supra note 11; Kahane, supra note
11; HIGHWAY LOSS DATA INSTI'[TE, 1988 MODELS: THREE YEAR RESULTS, INSURANCE
COLLISION REPORT (including appendix RO-90-2, 1990); Where is Safety, supra
note 5; Comparison Shows, supra note 12; Klein et al., supra note 11; G. ERNST,
E. BRUHNING, K GLAEER & M. SCHMID, COMPATIBILITY PROBLEMS OF SMALL AND
LARGE CARS IN HEAD-ON COLLISIONS, (91-S 1-0-12, Fed. Hghwy. Resh. Inst.,
Germany, 1991); Hackney, The Effects of FMVSS N. 208 and NCAP on Safety as
Determined from Crash Test Results, 13th Intemat'l Tech. Conf. Experimental
Safety Vehicles, Paris, France, November 4-7, 1991; Evans, Mass Ratio and
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In light of the new empirical studies and the issues raised by OTA
and GAO, this report updates the Crandall and Graham study of
198917 and analyzes the potential safety risks of new fuel economy
legislation. The ultimate purpose of the report is to provide a range of
estimates of the safety risks of tighter fuel economy legislation, taking
into account uncertainty about how vehicle manufacturers will comply
with tighter CAFE standards. The safety estimates in this report are
based on the most comprehensive examination of the scientific literature
on vehicle dimensions and safety that has yet been published.
Since this report addresses only the safety issue, it does not offer
any global recommendation about whether new fuel economy legislation
should be adopted. While occupant safety is a critical concern, policy
makers should consider all the costs and benefits of fuel economy
legislation, including policy alternatives other than regulation of new
cars. 18
CAFE and New Legislative Proposals
The CAFE program requires each vehicle manufacturer to meet a
fleetwide average fuel economy target for its new cars, and a separate
target for its light trucks. Since manufacturers must design vehicles
Relative Driver Fatality Risk in Two-Vehicle Crashes, (GM Resh. Labs. GMR-
7419, 1991); Evans & Frick, Car Size or Car Mass- Which Has Greater Influence
on Fatality Risk? (GM Resh. Labs., GMR-7462, 1991); Evans & Frick, Driver
Fatality Risk in Two-Car Crashes -Dependence on Masses of Driven and Striking
Car, 13th Internat'l Tech. Conf. Experimental Safety Vehicles 1991; Robertson,
How to Save Fuel and Reduce Injuries in Automobiles, 31 J. TRAUMA 107 (1991);
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ScIENCES (NAS), AUTOMOTIVE FUEL ECONOMY: How FAR
SHOULD WE GC? (1992).
17 Crandall & Graham, supra note 10.
18 R. CRANDALL, H. GRUENSPECHT, T. KEELER, & L LAVE, REGULATING THE
AUTOMOBILE (1986); Crandall & Graham, New Fuel Economy Standards? The
American Enterprise, Mar./Apr. 1991, at 68; R. LEONE & T. PARKINSON, CONSERVING
ENERGY: Is THERE A BETER WAY? (1990); CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, POLICY
ALTERNATIVES FOR REDUCING PEIROLEUM USE AND GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS,
FINAL REPORT (1991).
3 RISK -Issues in Health & Safety 95 [Spring 1992]
roughly five years before being sold, they are not always able to sell as
many fuel-efficient vehicles to consumers as they had planned.
Consumer interest in fuel economy is sluggish because of the low price
of gasoline and the declining relative importance of fuel costs in the total
costs of operating a motor vehicle. 19
The 1975 legislation called for steady increases in the MPG targets
for passenger cars from 18 MPG in 1978 to 27.5 MPG in 1985. The
Department of Transportation now has the discretion to adjust MPG
targets on a year-to-year basis, and has set a 27.5 MPG target for each
of the last three years. Under the CAFE program, manufacturers may
use MPG credits earned in good years to pay off MPG deficits
experienced in bad years. Deficits may also be carried forward if
manufacturers can show credible product plans that promise MPG
credits in future years.
The collapse of gasoline prices in the early 1980's and increasing
consumer interest in large, high-performance cars have caused some
manufacturers to experience difficulties in meeting their CAFE targets.
General Motors (GM) and Ford Motor Company (Ford) exhausted most
of their fuel economy credits in the late 1980's. Mercedez and other
European manufacturers of large, fuel consuming cars have chosen to
pay noncompliance penalties for years.
The major domestic vehicle manufacturers are reluctant to miss
CAFE targets consistently. Failure of manufacturers to meet CAFE
standards is considered "unlawful conduct." The ultimate penalty for
noncompliance with CAFE is $50 per MPG per vehicle of shortfall. If
GM was assessed a penalty for a 1 MPG shortfall in its passenger car
fleet, the total fine could exceed $150 million. Manufacturers also
recognize that failure to satisfy CAFE requirements may undermine their
credibility in Washington on a wide range of public policy issues. Also,
major manufacturers wish to avoid engaging in behavior that Congress
19 Greene, CAFE or Price? An Analysis of the Effects of Federal Fuel Economy
Regulations and Gasoline Price on New Car MPG, 1978-89, 11 ENERGY J. 37
(1990); Leone & Parkinson, supra note 18; OTA, supra note 4.
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has deemed "unlawful". Hence, CAFE compliance is taken very
seriously by most vehicle manufacturers.
Due to frustration with administration of the CAFE program, several
legislators have proposed bills that would revamp and tighten fuel
economy standards. Senator Richard Bryan (D-NV) has introduced the
most ambitious bill, calling for a 20% increase (using 1988 as the base
year) in fleetwide MPG by 1996 (to about 34 MPG) and a 40% increase
by 2001 (to about 40 MPG). The Bryan bill would apply the same
percentage increases to both imports and domestics, and to both
passengers cars and light trucks. 20 In the House of Representatives a
bill introduced by Representative Barbara Boxer (D-CA) calls for a 60%
increase in fuel economy by 2001.21 In order to assess the safety
consequences of such proposals, it is necessary to consider how
manufacturers might respondto intensified regulatory pressures.
Compliance Strategies
Faced with more stringent fuel economy targets, manufacturers
would need to modify their product designs and marketing plans. The
following five, long-term strategies might be employed to comply with
new legislation:
0 Make technological improvements in the design of
engines, transmissions, tires and vehicles that improve fuel
economy without reducing interior volume, vehicle weight,
or the external dimensions of the vehicle;
Reduce vehicle performance by curtailing engine size,
horsepower, and acceleration capability;
a Achieve vehicle weight reduction by substitution of
lighter materials and incorporation of other technological
improvements that facilitate weight reduction without
reducing interior volume or the external dimensions of the
vehicle;
20 S. 279, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced Jan. 29, 1991.
21 H.R. 446, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., introduced Jan. 4, 1991.
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* Engage in vehicle downsizing by reducing the exterior
dimensions of the vehicle and associated vehicle weight; and
* Engage in mix shifting toward smaller, lighter vehicles
by discontinuing certain lines of large cars and/or offering
more marketing incentives to encourage sales of small cars.
Since the future decisions of vehicle producers and consumers are
difficult to predict, no one knows exactly what combination of strategies
would be instituted to meet, say, the ambitious MPG targets in the
Bryan bill. As we shall see, the strategy chosen by manufacturers,
which is not constrained in recent legislative proposals, would influence
strongly the magnitude of the safety consequences that are likely to
occur.
Learning from History
Perhaps the most instructive exercise is to examine how
manufacturers achieved the doubling of new car fuel economy since
1973. All of the strategies cited above played a significant role.
Technological modifications of the vehicle and its components gave
an important boost to new car fuel economy. The key technical
improvements included the proliferation of automatic transmissions with
lockup, the rapid introduction of computerized fuel injection systems,
and the transition from rear-wheel to front-wheel drive (and associated
weight reductions). Figure 1 tracks the penetration of improvements into
the new car fleet.22
Vehicle size and weight were also reduced substantially to improve
fuel economy. The average new car's "shadow," defined as vehicle
length times vehicle width, has declined 16% from model year 1974 to
model year 1990. The curb weight of an 'average new car sold in the
U.S. has declined by about 20% since 1974.23 These declines in
vehicle size and weight are estimated to account for roughly half of the
improvement in new car fuel economy achieved since 1974.24
22 OTA,supranote4.
23 Id
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Figure 1
Fuel Economy Boosters 1977-90
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Table 1 reveals how Ford's 1972 and 1992 new-car offerings differ
in curb weight and shadow. While both shadow and weight have
declined, most of the changes have occurred in the mid-size and large
cars. This pattern is mirrored in all new car sales. Vehicle weight
reductions have been achieved primarily in the medium and heavy
weight classes, which has resulted in a less variable distribution of car
weights than existed ten years ago.25
The fraction of the new car market accounted for by large cars
declined from about 60% in 1978 to 40% in 1990.26 Some
24 Crandall & Graham, supra note 10.
25 GAO, supra note 14.
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manufacturers, such as Chrysler Corporation, have reduced their
offerings of large cars. Other manufacturers, such as Ford, have sought
to stimulate small car sales through special pricing, incentive, and
advertising strategies.27
Table 1
Downsizing of Ford Cars, 1972-92
Size Class 1972 1992 %A Shadow A Curb Wt. (lbs)
Subcompact Mustang II Mustang
CQmpact Pinto
Maverick (4 door)Comet (4 door)
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Lg. Wagon Ford LTD Wgn. Crown Vic. Wgn. -5 -952
Marquis Wgn. Gr. Marq. Wgn. -5 -971
Source: Ford Motor Company (1991)
While performance reduction played a positive role in the early years
of the CAFE program, consumers have rejected this strategy. Perhaps
26 NHTSA, supra note 2.
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the most important drag on fuel economy has been renewed consumer
interest in engine horsepower. As Figure 2 indicates, average
horsepower per pound of vehicle curb weight has been increasing
rapidly since 1980, and is now exceeding the levels achieved by the
"muscle" cars of the 1960's.2 8
Figure 2
1955-91 Trends in New Cars: Horsepower per Curb Weight
5557 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 91
Model Year
While the passenger car fleet has become lighter and somewhat more
uniform in curb weight, sales of trucks (particularly light trucks) have
been increasing rapidly since 1980. Light trucks alone have increased
from 17% of the "light-duty" market in 1980 to 32% in 1991.29 While
light trucks are subject to fuel economy regulation, they are much less
fuel efficient than the average passenger car.
28 NHTSA, supra note 2.
29 Id.
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In light of contemporary market pressures, manufacturers would
find it extremely difficult to achieve the ambitious MPG targets outlined
in the Bryan bill.30 In the absence of a crystal ball, the most sensible
prediction would seem to be that manufacturers will respond to
intensified fuel economy demands by employing a combination of
strategies used between 1974 to 1990. While the precise mix of
strategies may change due to subtle changes in technology, economics
and consumer demand, there is no reason to expect that any one will
play a dominant or exclusive role.
Key Safety Relationships
This analysis of vehicle safety begins from the premise that fuel
economy legislation will not change the frequency of vehicle crashes.
(This premise is discussed further and ultimately relaxed below). The
key concern that has been raised is whether a smaller, lighter fleet of
vehicles induced by regulatory pressure will experience a higher rate of
occupant injury and death in crashes that do occur (sometimes called
diminished "crashworthiness").
As the real-world crash data in Figure 3 suggest, small car
occupants face greater risks of injury in crashes than do occupants of
large cars. Note that collision frequency has been held constant in this
comparison by dividing the number of driver injuries by the number of
tow-away crashes. The effect of car dimensions on injury risk persists
when potential confounding factors such as driver age, crash severity,
and type of vehicle damage are controlled.3 1 The experimental crash-
test data from the NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program (NACP)
also indicate that small car occupants are exposed to more injurious
crash forces than are occupants of large cars, holding constant crash
severity and restraint use.32
30 OTA, supra note4.
31 Partyka & Boehly, supra note 11.
32 Hackney, supra note 16.
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Figure 333
Probability of Driver Injury (AIS > 3) in a





In Figure 3, the disadvantage of the small car occupant is apparent in
both single-vehicle and multi-vehicle crashes. The importance of the
single-vehicle crash tends to be neglected in discussions of the safety
issue.34 Single-vehicle and multi-vehicle crashes each account for
33 The classes between "mini" and "largest" are, in increasing size: "subcompact,"
compact," "intermediate" and "full." This data is from Partyka & Boehly, supra note
11.
34 J. HEDLUND, THE EFFECTS OF VEHICLE SIZE ON OCCUPANT FATALITIES (NHTSA
1982).
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about half of all passenger car occupant fatalities. 35 Hence, both crash
types merit serious investigation.
Injury Risk in Multi-Vehicle Crashes
Why are small-car occupants at greater danger than large-car
occupants in multi-vehicle crashes? Both vehicle weight and vehicle size
(e.g., exterior dimensions or shadow) play a role. We begin by
analyzing the role of vehicle weight and then address the role of vehicle
size.
Physical intuition suggests that the lighter the vehicle in a multi-
vehicle crash, the more energy (and hence risk) will be transferred to its
occupants. When light cars are struck by heavy cars, the occupants of
light cars are in greater danger of injury than are the occupants of heavy
cars. 36 Yet lighter vehicles transfer less energy (and hence risk) to the
occupants of other vehicle(s) in a multi-vehicle crash.3 7 Hence, light
vehicles make a contribution to safety because they are less "aggressive"
in multi-vehicle crashes than are heavy vehicles.
If we imagine one car being made lighter in a two-car crash, the
occupant risk in the car with diminished weight should increase while
the occupant risk in the second car should decline. Physical intuition
does not tell us whether the total amount of injury risk in the two cars
will increase or decrease. 38 The two effects might cancel each other
completely, or one effect might outweigh the other. A recent simulation
study illustrates that either outcome is possible.39 Only good empirical
35 NHTSA, FATAL ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM (1990).
36 Campbell & Reinfurt, supra note 6; Grime & Hutchinson, The Influence of
Vehicle Weight on the Risk of Injury to Drivers, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH
TECHNICALCONFERENCEON EPEIMENTALSAFEY VEHICLES (NHTSA 1982); Evans,
Mass Ratio, supra note 16.
37 Dreyer, Richter & Zobel, Handling, Braking, and Crash Compatibility Aspects
of Small, Front-Wheel Drive Vehicles, (Soc'y Auto. Eng. Tech. Paper Ser. 810792,
1981); Richter & Zobel, Aspects of the Passive Safety of Motor Vehicles, Presented
at 9th Intern'l Tech. Conf. Experimental Safety Vehicles, 1982.; GAO, supra note
14; OTA, supra note 4.
38 Evans & Frick, Driver Fatality, supra note 16.
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evidence can resolve this mystery.
A recent study of two-vehicle crashes in Texas examined the impacts
of the weights of vehicle 1 and vehicle 2 on the probability of serious
driver injury in vehicle 1.40 When crash type, crash speed, driver age
and driver sex are held constant, the investigators found, as expected,
that the weights of the two vehicles exerted opposing effects. More
weight in vehicle 1 decreased the risk of injury to the driver of vehicle 1
while more weight in vehicle 2 increased the risk of injury to the driver
in vehicle 1.
Interestingly, each 100 pounds of weight subtracted from vehicle 1
was associated with a net increase in net risk to both drivers. The sum
of the injury risk to both drivers increased by 1.4% for each 100 pound
reduction in the weight of vehicle 1.4 1 This result replicates a similar
finding reported in the 1970's.42 The finding should be interpreted
cautiously because the protective effect of the extra weight of vehicle 1
may partly reflect the protective effect of more vehicle size (e.g.,
external dimensions) that is usually associated with extra vehicle weight.
It is natural to speculate about whether a fleet of vehicles of uniform
weight is more or less safe than a mixture of heavy and light vehicles,
holding constant the mean weight of the fleet. Early theoretical and
empirical work suggested that a uniform weight distribution produces
more fleet safety than a variable distribution of vehicle weights4 3 The
most recent empirical study came to the opposite conclusion,4 4
39 NAS, supra note 16.
40 Klein et al., supra note 11.
41 Id.
42 Mela, How Safe Can We Be in Small Cars? PROCEEDINGS THIRD INTERN'L
CONF. AUTO. SAFETY (1974); Mela, A Statistical Relation Between Car Weight and
Injuries. Technical Note (NHTSA 1975); H. JOKSCH, ANALYSIS OF THE FuTURE
EFFECIS OF FUEL SHORTAGE AND INCREASED SMALL CARUSAGE UPON TRAFFIC DEATHS
AND ImuRiEs (NHTSA 1976).
43 O'Neill, Joksch & Haddon, Relationships Between Car Size, Car Weight, and
Crash Injuries in Car-to-Car Crashes, PROCEEDINGS THIRD INTERN'L CONF. AUTO.
SAFETY (1974).
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suggesting that a fleet of variable vehicle weights is safer than a fleet of
uniform weight (holding constant mean fleet weight). In both studies the
magnitude of the difference is slight and can safely be ignored in first-
order calculations of the safety impacts of smaller new cars.
While vehicle weight is a mixed blessing in two-vehicle crashes,
vehicle size is unequivocally protective. Physical intuition suggests that
more vehicle size (e.g., more vehicle shadow and structure) is a
protective factor in a multi-vehicle crash.4 5 Increased vehicle size
makes more "crush space" available to manage energy, and more space
to "ride down" the crash. A large car occupant is decelerated over a
longer distance than a small car occupant and therefore is exposed to
weaker crash forces.4 6 In two-vehicle crashes, increased vehicle size
provides superior occupant protection without imposing extra risk on
the occupants of the other vehicle (assuming more size is provided
without adding weight).
Why are small cars at such a disadvantage in crashes with large
cars? Is it their lack of size and inferior crush space, or is it their weight
disadvantage? This question is difficult to answer because vehicle size
and weight are highly correlated. The only study to address this
question used wheelbase as the indicator of vehicle size. When cars of
similar wheelbase collide, vehicle weight is a strong predictor of driver
fatality risk. When cars of similar weight collide, wheelbase is a weak
predictor of driver fatality risk. This evidence suggests that the
disadvantage of the small car occupant in multi-vehicle crashes is
attributable primarily to its weight disadvantage rather than to inferior
size and less crashworthiness. 47
There is, however, suggestive evidence that more vehicle size offers
44 Evans & Frick, Car Size, supra note 16.
45 Joksch, supra note 42; O'Neill et al., supra note 43; O'Neill et al., supra note
6.
46 Joksch, Effect of Small Cars on Traffic Safety Projections (Soc'y Auto. Eng.
Tech. Paper Ser. 840878, 1984).
47 Evans & Frick, Car Size, supra note 16.
Graham: Safety Risks and Fuel Economy 111
significant occupant protection in multi-vehicle crashes. Several
independent studies have found that more people are injured or killed
when two small cars collide than when two large cars collide.48 Since
the opposing vehicle weights (and hence crash forces) are roughly equal
in the two collisions (assuming speed at impact is comparable), most
analysts attribute the disadvantage of the small car occupants to smaller
vehicle size (i.e., smaller exterior dimensions).
Moreover, in two-vehicle crashes involving one vehicle of
essentially infinite weight (e.g., a large truck), occupants of small cars
fare worse than occupants of large cars. Since the weight difference
between the large and small car should make little difference when
striking a large truck (unless the exterior of the truck is penetrable or
crushable), analysts suspect that it is extra vehicle size (perhaps more
structure and crush space) that offers the superior protection to
occupants in the large car.4 9 Some analysts believe that light-
truck/small-car collisions will produce more deaths and serious injuries
than large-car/small-car collisions due to the stiff design of light trucks
(which is harmful to the occupants of both vehicles). This hypothesis
deserves additional study in the future.
In summary, more vehicle size (e.g., larger exterior dimensions)
enhances fleet safety in multi-vehicle crashes due to improved
crashworthiness. Extra vehicle weight helps those occupants who have
it and hurts those who are struck by it due to the aggressivity effect.50
48 O'Day, Golomb & Cooley, A Statistical Description of Large and.Small Car
Involvement in Accidents, 3 IT LAB RPTS. 1 (1973); Campbell & Reinfurt, supra
note 6; Zaremba, Injuries to Unrestrained Occupants in Small Car-Small Car and
Large Car-Large Car Head-On Collisions, 12 ACCIDENT ANAL & PREy. 11 (1980);
Wasielewski & Evans, Do Drivers of Small Cars Take Less Risk in Everyday
Driving? 5 RISK ANAL. 25 (1985); Evans, supra note 16; Evans & Frick, Driver
Fatality, supra note 16; Ernst et al., supra note 16.
49 Evans, Driver Fatalities Versus Car Mass Using a New Exposure Approach, 16
ACCIDENT ANAL & PREV. 19 (1984); Evans, Accident Involvement Rate and Car
Size, 16 ACCIDENT ANAL & PREY. 387 (1984); Evans & Frick, Car Size, supra
note 16; Evans & Frick, Driver Fatality, supra note 16.
50 O'Neill et al., supra note 43; Sparrow, Accident Involvement and Injury Rates
for Small Cars in Japan, 17 ACCIDENT ANAL & PREy. 409 (1985); GAO, supra
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The overall safety impact of reducing vehicle weight (without reducing
vehicle size) in multi-vehicle crashes is unknown. The outcome may
depend significantly on the relative strength and flexibility of substitute
materials used to accomplish weight reduction.5 1 If both vehicle size
and weight are reduced, the net impact on occupant safety in multi-
vehicle crashes is negative, although there may be a few circumstances
when the safety benefits from reduced aggressivity are dominant.5 2 In
the analysis that follows, we assume that weight reduction alone
(without size reduction) causes no net increase in the number of deaths
and injuries in multi-vehicle crashes.
Injury Risk in Single-Vehicle Crashes
If a vehicle strikes an absolutely immovable, unbreakable,
impenetrable object, the vehicle's weight per se has no impact on the
occupant's risk of injury. When the object is movable, breakable, or
penetrable, more vehicle weight reduces the risk of occupant injury
because the object absorbs some of the crash energy. Since many
guardrails, sign posts, walls, bushes and trees are somewhat movable,
breakable, or penetrable, we should expect occupants of heavy vehicles
to suffer fewer deaths and serious injuries in single-vehicle crashes than
occupants of light vehicles. 53 While the aggressivity of heavier
vehicles is harmful to occupants of other vehicles in multi-vehicle
crashes, aggressivity is a protective feature for occupants in single-
vehicle crashes.
The magnitude of the protective effect of vehicle weight per se is
unknown because studies of real-world, single-vehicle crashes have not
disentangled the effects of vehicle size and weight. Vehicle size exerts a
protective effect in single-vehicle crashes for precisely the same reasons
note 14.
51 OTA, supra note 4.
52 NAS, supra note 16.
53 Evans & Frick, Car Size, supra note 16.
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that it protects occupants in multi-vehicle crashes. More size and
structure leads to better energy management and less energy applied to
the occupant.
The combined impact of vehicle size and weight on injury risk in
single-vehicle crashes has been studied by numerous investigators.
While some investigators have found equivocal evidence of an
association, 54 many studies find a systematic association between
vehicle size/weight and injury risk in single-vehicle collisions.55 Figure
4 presents the findings of one of the more recent, well-designed studies
of this question.5 6 One recent study estimates that each 100 pound
reduction in vehicle weight/size is associated with a 1.0% increase in the
risk of injury in single-vehicle crashes. 57 Crash tests of vehicles into
bridge rails with varying degrees of flexibility suggest a similar
protective effect of vehicle size and weight.58
The point has been made that some small cars outperform in crash
tests than some large cars. 59 While true (and may reflect better small
car design), the statements is somewhat misleading. Fixed barriers used
in crash tests are designed to be impenetrable and immovable, which
removes weight advantages of large cars. In real-world, single-vehicle
crashes, barriers are often penetrable, breakable or movable.60
54 Campbell & Reinfurt supra note 6; Stewart & Stutts, A Categorical Analysis
of the Relationship Between Vehicle Weight and Driver Injury in Automobile
Crashes, (Hghwy. Safety Resh Ctr., U. N. Car., 1978); Joksch & Thoren, Car
Size and Occupant Fatality Risk, Adjusted for Differences in Drivers and Driving
Conditions (Report to AAA Fndn. Traffic Safety 1984).
55 O'Day et al., supra note 48; Joksch, supra note 42; O'Neill et al., supra note
6; H. JOKSCH, LIGHT-WEIGHT CAR SAFETY ANALYSIS, PHASE 11, PART HI: OCCuPANT
FATAUTY AND INuRY RISKIN RELATION TO CAR WEGHT (Ctr. Environ. & Man 1983);
Evans, Car Mass and Likelihood of Occupant Fatality (Soc'y Auto. Eng. Tech.
Paper Ser. 820807, 1982); Evans, Driver Fatalities, supra note 49; Evans, Accident
Involvement, supra note 49.
56 Partyka & Boehly, note 11.
57 Klein et al., supra note 11.
58 Ivey, Smaller Cars and Highway Safety, Texas Transportation Researcher, April
1981, at 5.
59 OTA, supra note4.
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Figure 461
Relative Risk of Driver Incapacitating Injury in a
Single-Vehicle, Tow-away Crash by Vehicle Size
Mini Largest
Weight Class
The increasing population of small cars has been a special concern to
highway engineers because many guardrails, sign posts and highway
fixtures were not designed for such small vehicles. Small cars may be
caught in guardrails or unable to dislodge breakaway sign posts, at least
60 Evans & Frick, Car Size, supra note 16; Evans & Frick, Driver Fatality, supra
note 16.
61 See supra note 35. This data is also from Partyka & Boehly, supra note 11.
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until highways are redesigned to accommodate smaller, lighter
vehicles.62
Some analysts have speculated that car weight may be a hostile
force in crashes involving pedestrians. 63 In fact, the studies on car
weight and pedestrian injury have found no evidence that car weight
affects the severity of pedestrian injury.64 This finding is reasonable on
physical grounds since the lightest car is much heavier than the heaviest
pedestrian.
Vehicle Dimensions and Collision Frequency
Intuition suggests that small cars are more maneuverable than large
cars. 6 5 Is there any evidence that small cars are less likely to be
involved in crashes than large cars? The answer to this question is not
known with certainty because driver behavior dominates vehicle
attributes as a predictor of collision frequency. Powerful human factors
(such as driver risk taking, vision, skill, attentiveness and inebriation)
are not measured reliably in crash data systems. Hence, it is difficult to
determine whether vehicle dimensions play a significant role in collision
frequency.
Analysts generally find that small cars have higher crude rates of
collision (per registered vehicle or per vehicle mile of travel) than do
large cars.6 6 This association is not very meaningful because the
drivers are not the same in small cars and large cars, and small cars tend
62 Ivey, supra note 58; Richter & Zobel, supra note 37.
63 Sparrow & Whitford, The Coming MinilMacro Car Crisis: Do We Need a New
Definition? 18A TRANS. RESH. 289 (1984); Sparrow, supra note 50.
64 Wolfe & O'Day, A Study of Vehicle Factors Related to Type and Severity of
Pedestrian Injury, (Hghwy Safety Resh. Inst., U. Mich. 1982); Evans, Driver
Fatalities, supra note 49; Evans, Accident Involvement, supra note 49; Evans,
Driver Behavior Revealed in Relations Involving Car Mass in HUMAN BEIAVIOR
AND TRAFc SAFETY 337 (L. Evans & R. Schwing eds.1985).
65 How Safe Are Small Cars? Consumer Reports, Apr. 1976, at 188.
66 Dutt, Reinfurt & Stutts, Accident Involvement and Crash Injury Rates: An
Investigation by Make, Model and Year of Car, 9 ACCIDENT ANAL. & PREy. 275
(1977).
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to be driven in urban areas where collision rates are higher. A single
confounding variable, driver age, exerts a dramatic influence on this
association. 6 7 Young drivers are more likely to be involved in
collisions than old drivers, excluding the oldest drivers.68
When analysts control for driver age in studies of vehicle size and
collision frequency, no consistent association is found.6 9 Some
analysts find that small cars are in fewer collisions, 7 0 while other
analysts find that small cars have higher age-adjusted collision
frequenpies. 7 1 Since the conflicting studies often use different
definitions of collisions (e.g., police-reported crashes versus crashes
that lead to an insurance claim), it is difficult to resolve the
discrepancies. None of these studies control for other important
behavioral attributes such as driver attitudes toward risk taking and the
degree of driver inebriation.
Some analysts have speculated that large cars, which tend to be
equipped with powerful engines, may be involved in more crashes than
small cars due to speeding or rapid acceleration. The only empirical
study of this effect did not control for differences in driver behavior.72
67 Evans, Driver Fatalities, supra note 49; Evans, Accident Involvement, supra
note 49.
68 Williams & Carsten, Driver Age and Crash Involvement, 79 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 326 (1989).
69 D. REINFURT & B. CAMPBELL, MILEAGE CRASH RATES FOR CERTAIN CAR MAKE
AND MODELYEAR COMBINATIONS: A PRELIMINARY STUDY (Hghwy. Safety Resh Ctr.,
U. N. Car. 1974).
70 Evans, Driver Fatalities, supra note 49; Evans, Accident Involvement, supra
note 49; Joksch, Small Car Accident Involvement Study (Draft Final Report to
NHTSA October 30, 1985); Evans, Involvement Rate in Two-Car Crashes Versus
Driver Age and Car Mass of Each Involved Car, 17 ACCIDENT ANAL & PREY. 155
(1985); Evans, Driver Age, Car Mass and Accident Exposure - A Synthesis of
Available Data, 17 ACCIDENT ANAL. & PREV. 439 (1985); Sparrow, supra note 50.
71 Consumer Reports supra note 65; HIGHWAY LoSS DATA INSTITUTE, THE EFFECTS
OF CAR SIZE ON CRASH LOSSES, 1977-1980 MODELS (1981); Small-Car Deaths,
supra note 12; HIGHWAY Loss DATA INSTITUTE, 1988 MODELS: THREE YEAR
RESULTS, INSURANCE COLuION REPORT (including appendix 1990).
72 Robertson, supra note 16.
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The opposite phenomenon may also occur to some extent: Cars with
greater acceleration capability may avoid some crashes (e.g., in passing
maneuvers) that cars with less acceleration capability cannot avoid.
Overall, there is no sound scientific evidence that the acceleration
capability of vehicles per se is a major factor in collision frequency.
Another possibility is that pedestrians and cyclists are more likely to
be hit by big vehicles than be small vehicles. Not only is there a
difference in maneuverability and stopping distance, but there is the
simple matter of vehicle width that, all else equal, should influence the
probability that a pedestrian or cyclist is struck in various collision
modes. This hypothesis deserves careful study, although driver and
pedestrian/cyclist behaviors also need to be carefully considered.
The only causal relationship between car dimensions and collision
frequency that is fairly secure involves the rollover crash, which is a
crash mode that is likely to result in serious injury or death to occupants.
A vehicle's directional stability refers to a vehicle's likelihood of off-
road excursion. A vehicle's rollover stability refers to the tendency of
the vehicle to remain upright during an off-road excursion that is
interrupted by a tripping mechanism. Small cars tend to have less
directional and rollover stability than large cars.73
Early empirical studies found that small cars have larger rates of
rollover fatality than large cars. 74 No evidence was found that these
differences were related to differences in vehicle crashworthiness. The
differences in rollover propensity are difficult to attribute to vehicle
dimensions per se because driver behavior may be a confounding factor.
A recent study used a vehicle's frontal crash fatality rate as a control
for driver behavior and still found that small cars have higher rates of
fatal rollover crashes than do large cars. Each 100 pounds of added
73 Kahane, supra note 11.
74 Garrett, A Study of Rollover in Rural U.S. Automobile Accidents (Soc'y Auto.
Eng. Tech. Paper Ser. 680772, 1968); L. GRIFFIN. PROBABILITY OF OVERTURNIN
SINGLE VEHICLE ACCIDEmS AS A FUNCTION OF ROAD TYPE AND PASSENGER CAR CURB
WEGIrr (Tex. Trans. Inst. 1981); Partyka, supra note 11.
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vehicle weight was associated with a 3.6% decrease in the rollover
fatality rate. 75 This study was not able to determine which vehicle
dimensions (weight, length, width, or height) were responsible for the
propensity of small cars to be involved in rollover crashes, although the
vehicle's center of gravity is clearly important. Since this estimate is
based on data from 1970-1982 models, it may not be indicative of the
experiences of cars produced today.
In summary, the safety literature has not established a causal
relationship between vehicle size and collision frequency, 76 except in
the case of rollover crashes. The difficulty in establishing such
relationships, if they exist, is the dominant influence of driver behavior
on crash frequency. A method and data base for studying vehicle
dimensions and collision frequency is urgently needed.
Summarizing Recent Empirical Estimates
Our review of the safety literature suggests that decreasing vehicle
size and weight will increase the overall (net) risk of injury to occupants
in multi-vehicle and single-vehicle crashes, despite the beneficial
influence of reduced vehicle aggressivity in multi-vehicle crashes. If
vehicle weight is reduced without reducing vehicle size, then no net
increase in occupant injury risk is predicted in multi-vehicle crashes,
although some elevation 'of risk will certainly occur in single-vehicle
crashes. There is no strong empirical evidence suggesting that vehicle
dimensions affect collision frequencies, except for the frequency of
rollover crashes.
In Table 2, recent empirical estimates of the impact of vehicle size
and weight on injury and fatality risk are summarized. While vehicle
weight is reported as the primary independent variable, it should be
understood as representing the joint effects of vehicle size and weight.
The estimates in Table 2 have been selected on the basis of recency of
data and quality of study design. The data based on passenger cars are
75 Kahane, supra note 11.
76 Joksch, supra note 55.
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also applied to light trucks, which introduces an unknown degree of
uncertainty into the analysis. These estimates are used in the next section
to make a range of estimates of the impact of new fuel economy
legislation on traffic injury counts.
Table 2
Estimated Impact of 100 Pound Reduction in Vehicle Size/Weight
on Occupant Injury Risk by Crash Type
Crash Type % Change In Injury Risk Reference
Two-Vehicle 1.4 Klein et. al, 1991
One-Vehicle (Nonrollover) 1.0 Klein et. al, 1991
One-Vehicle (Rollover) 3.6 Kahane, 1990
"This estimate takes into account the overall change in injury risk to drivers of both
vehicles that is associated with a 100 pound reduction in vehicle weight. Thus, it
represents the net impact of changes in crashworthiness and aggressivity.
Note: Cars and light trucks are treated as homogeneous even though coefficients are
based on data from cars alone. Also, car crashes involving medium-heavy trucks are treated
as one-vehicle, nonrollover crashes.
Estimating the Safety Consequences of New Legislation
In order to estimate the safety consequences of new legislation, it is
necessary to predict how manufacturers will respond to ambitious fuel
economy targets, such as those prescribed in the Bryan bill. For
illustrative purposes, we consider an optimistic scenario, a pessimistic
scenario and a most-likely scenario.
Under the optimistic scenario, vehicle manufacturers achieve
ambitious fuel economy targets primarily through technological
improvements, 77 and a modest reduction in average vehicle weight
(300 pounds per vehicle). A small amount of downsizing and mix
shifting causes a slight reduction in vehicle size, and an associated 100
77 Difiglio, Duleep & Greene, Cost Effectiveness of Future Fuel Economy
Improvements, 11 ENERGY J. 65 (1990).
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pound reduction in vehicle weight. Overall, the scenario entails a 400
pound decline in average vehicle weight. Readers should recognize that
this scenario is extremely optimistic. The recent OTA study, which has
produced optimistic estimates of fuel economy gains from new
technology, states that manufacturers could not meet the early MPG
target in the Bryan bill without some mix shifting or downsizing,
especially if consumer interest in engine horsepower continues to
grow.78 The NAS study concluded that such targets are not achievable
in the prescribed time frame.79
Under the pessimistic scenario, manufacturers make little
incremental progress through technological improvements and are
forced to rely primarily on size reduction and mix shifting.80 The result
is a 900 pound reduction in average vehicle weight with corresponding
declines in the exterior dimensions of the vehicle fleet. Scientists at Ford
believe that a 600-1000 pound reduction in size and weight would be
necessary to achieve the 40 MPH targets.81 This scenario is pessimistic
because it grants little plausibility to the various technological
improvements that have been proposed to improve fuel economy.
Under the most-likely scenario, manufacturers engage in a mix of
the compliance strategies described earlier. They accomplish part of the
fuel economy gain by technological improvements and substitution of
lighter materials. This leads to a 300 pound weight reduction, as
described in the optimistic scenario. The remainder of the fuel economy
gain is achieved by another 300 pound reduction in vehicle weight,
which is caused by corresponding declines in the size of the vehicle fleet
(due to downsizing and mix shifting). This scenario is considered most
78 S. Plotkin, Testimony on Legislative Proposals to Increase Automotive Fuel
Economy and Promote Alternative Transportation Fuels, House Subcomm. Energy
and Power, Comm. Energy & Commerce (transcript, Apr. 17, 1991); OTA, supra
note 4.
79 NAS, supra note 16.
80 2FUELEooNOMY 1(1990).
81 Letter from D. Kulp to author, February 6, 1992.
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likely because the historical evidence suggests that manufacturers tend to
use a mix of strategies to comply with fuel economy regulation. For
purposes of policy analysis, the actual behavior of manufacturers is
more relevant than technological possibilities whose probability of
implementation is remote.
The baseline scenario (without new fuel economy legislation) is a
safety toll of 30,000 fatalities and 150,000 serious injuries in crashes
involving passenger cars and light trucks. A nonfatal "serious injury,"
defined as at least level 3 on the Abbreviated Injury Scale, would entail
at least eight days of hospitalization and four weeks of lost work.8 2
The most serious cases entail lifelong disablement and disfigurement.
The baseline counts corresponds roughly to the fatality and injury
experience of vehicle occupants in the late 1980's.83
The incremental safety impacts of the three compliance scenarios are
presented in Table 3. Steady-state estimates of the safety impact of new
legislation were calculated under the assumption of 100% fleet
penetration of redesigned vehicles. In reality, it would take 15 years for
new vehicles to replace most of the existing fleet. During this transition
period, it is assumed that the net effect of other safety policies (e.g., air
bags and relaxed speed limits) is no net change in the baseline counts of
fatalities and serious injuries. An independent panel of safety experts
concluded recently that, due to various offsetting influences, it is
unlikely that the annual traffic injury counts will improve or worsen
dramatically in the foreseeable future.84
The estimates in Table 3 are interesting in several respects. First, the
safety consequences of new fuel economy legislation are adverse in all
three compliance scenarios. In particular, single-vehicle crashes become
more dangerous to vehicle occupants under each compliance scenario.
Second, the magnitude of the adverse safety effects vary dramatically in
82 NHTSA, NATIONAL AccaDENT SAMPUNG SYSTEM 1986 (1988).
83 NHTSA, supra note 34.
84 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, SAFETY RESEARCH FOR A CHANGING
IGHWAY ENV]RONMENT, SPECIAL REPORT 229 (1991)
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the three scenarios. The compliance decisions of manufacturers emerge
as the critical factor in the safety analysis. Third, the uncertainties
reported in the optimistic and most-likely scenarios are significant. This
arises from the inability of safety analysts to distinguish the impact of
vehicle size and vehicle weight on injury risk in single-vehicle crashes.
Finally, the results of the most-likely scenario are broadly consistent
with the illustrative predictions of more complex simulation models. 85
Table 3
Steady-State Estimates of the Impacts of the Bryan Bill
on Fatal and Nonfatal Injuries
Crash Type Baseline Injury Counts: Estimated Increases in Injury Counts
Fatal under Alternative Compliance Scenarios:
Serious, Nonfatal Optimistic Most-Likely Pessimistic
Two-Vehicle 15,000 210 630 1,890
75,000 1,050 3,150 9,450
One-Vehicle [NRO] 9,000 90-360 270-540 810
45,000 450-1,800 1,350-2,700 4,050
One-Vehicle [RO] 6,000 216 648 1,944
30,000 1,080 3,240 3,149
Total 30,000 516-786 1,548-1,818 4,644
150,000 1,356-3,930 7,740-9,090 16,649
Despite the uncertainties, the results in Table 3 lend credence to the
safety concerns that have been raised about tighter fuel economy
legislation. The findings also suggest that the adverse safety impacts can
be minimized (but not eliminated) if legislation is modified to discourage
downsizing and mix shifting. If the optimistic claims made for
technological improvements prove to be illusory or exaggerated, the
85 Bunch, Smaller Cdrs and Safety: The Effect of Downsizing on Crash Fatalities
in 1995, The HSRI Research Review, Nov./Dec. 1978, at 1; Joksch, supra note
46; Lave, Conflicting Objectives in Regulating the Automobile, 212 SCIENCE 893(1981).
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adverse safety consequences of the Bryan bill could be quite large.
Offsetting Behavioral Responses
Insofar as new fuel economy legislation does induce smaller, lighter
vehicles that pose greater danger to vehicle occupants, some drivers may
respond by taking greater precautions through fastening safety belts and
driving more cautiously. It is difficult to predict how much offsetting
behavior might result from increases (say, 5%) in occupant injury risk
that have been projected to occur in the most-likely scenario.
Some studies suggest that drivers of small cars compensate
somewhat for the extra dangers that will transpire in the event of a
crash. For example, one study estimates that occupant death rates in
small cars are only half as large as they were projected to be on the basis
of physical calculations.8 6 There is also some observational evidence
that drivers of small cars take less risk in everyday driving than to
drivers of large cars87 . The behaviors observed include separation
between vehicles in heavy freeway traffic, speed on a two-lane road and
belt use. The inverse association between car mass and belt use may be
confounded by factors such as geography, vehicle age, vehicle
manufacturer and belt design.88
While some offsetting behavior may occur, there is no evidence that
such behavior is profound enough totally to offset the physical
disadvantages of a smaller, lighter fleet of vehicles. Long-term, time-
series analysis of highway fatality rates in the U.S. has demonstrated
that vehicle occupant fatality rates are inversely associated with the mean
weight of the vehicle fleet, after other highway, vehicle, and driver
characteristics are controlled.89 The findings in these studies suggest
86 Evans, Car Mass, supra note 55; Evans, Driver Behavior, supra note 63.
87 Wasielewski and Evans, supra note 48.
88 O'Neill, Williams, & Karpf, Passenger Car Size and Driver Belt Use, 73 AM.
J. PuB. HEALTH 588 (1983).
89 Crandall & Graham, Automobile Safety Regulation and Offsetting Driver
Behavior: Some New Empirical Estimates, 74 AM. ECONOMIC REV. 328 (1984);
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that little offsetting behavior occurs, although these macro-level studies
are prone to specification error.90
There is also some direct evidence that occupant death rates
increased in those makes of GM cars that were downsized in the late
1970's.91 Although this evidence provides little indication of offsetting
behavior, it cannot be used to estimate fleetwide safety impacts because
it does not incorporate the safety benefits of downsizing attributable to
diminished aggressivity in multi-vehicle crashes. 92
More Safety Regulation?
If new fuel economy legislation does exacerbate the highway safety
problem, one might expect that NHTSA could respond with new safety
regulations to prevent the higher risk to occupants. 9 3 While this
response might seem logical, it would not necessarily occur.
The technical basis for future motor vehicle safety standards has
been undercut by a persistent underfunding of biomechanics and safety
engineering research. 94 Moreover, the effectiveness of NHTSA's
vehicle safety program has tapered considerably since its aggressive
start in the late 1960's. 9 5 The 1980's revealed that the intensity of
NHTSA's regulatory program is highly vulnerable to political apathy in
the Administration and Congress - and to economic troubles in the
auto industry. 96 Since the federal government is likely to be placing
Crandall & Graham, supra note 10.
90 Khazzoom, supra note 14.
91 Comparison Shows, supra note 12.
92 Najjar, The Effects of Smaller Cars on Passenger Car Occupant Injuries in 3
COLL. TECH. STUDIES: ACCIDENT DATA ANAL. RESULTS & _ETHODOL. (NHTSA
1983).
93 Ctr. Auto Safety, supra note 15.
94 Trans. Resh. Bd., supra note 84.
95 J. CLAYBROOK, RETREAT FROM SAFETY (1984); Graham, Technology, Behavior,
and Safety: An Empirical Study of Automobile Occupant-Protection Regulation, 17
PoL'Y Sci. 141 (1984).
96 J. GRAHAM, AUIO SAFETY- ASSESSiNGAMEpiCA'SPERFORMANCE (1989).
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increasing pressure on the auto industry to reduce emissions from
tailpipes, it is not clear that sufficient political commitment will exist to
add another round of safety regulations.
Conclusion
The basic finding of this report is that ambitious fuel economy
legislation, such as proposed in the Bryan bill, will result in more deaths
and injuries on our nation's highways than would otherwise occur. The
precise magnitude of this effect is unknown because it is not clear how
manufacturers will comply with stricter fuel economy targets. If
significant vehicle downsizing and mix shifting occur, the safety toll is
likely to be large. If fuel economy targets are achieved entirely through
technological improvements, the safety toll will be modest. In the most
likely scenario, the effect will be a significant increase in traffic fatalities
and serious injuries.
The physical intuition behind the roles of vehicle size and weight in
determining occupant safety can be summarized. If two colliding cars
have the same size and crush space but different weights, the occupants
of the lighter (heavier) car experience a greater (lesser) velocity change
in a collision and therefore have a higher (lower) fatality risk. If the
lighter car was smaller and had less crush space, its occupants would
face even higher fatality risks in the collision due to less
crashworthiness. 97 If a vehicle is made lighter without being made
smaller, the net effect on occupant safety in multi-vehicle crashes is
unknown. In the single-vehicle crash, both vehicle size and weight
work to protect vehicle occupants.
If we consider ambitious MPG targets such as those in the Bryan
bill, the most likely, steady-state estimate of safety impacts is 1650
additional fatalities and 8500 additional serious injuries per year, or
about a 5% increase above baseline assumptions. It is difficult to be
optimistic that new safety rules would offset this increase in occupant
risk since few rules in the~history of NHTSA have been able to achieve
97 Joksch, supra note 46.
3 RISK -Issues in Health & Safety 95 [Spring 1992]
a 5% improvement in vehicle occupant safety. While these figures
assume that the best predictor of the compliance behavior of
manufacturers is historical experience, the degree of uncertainty in these
estimates is large. Some of the projected increase in safety risk may be
compensated for by improved driver behavior and new safety standards,
but there is little reason to be confident that the predicted safety risks
will be eliminated.
In the final analysis, policy makers should recognize the adverse
safety consequences of new fuel economy legislation. These adverse
impacts need to be weighed against the societal benefits of improved
fuel economy that are anticipated. Policy makers should consider
modifications to current legislative proposals that might minimize
adverse safety consequences without compromising the benefits of fuel
economy legislation. For example, more realistic MPG targets and
compliance schedules might be achieved by manufacturers without
significant safety risks.9 8 In the long run, policy makers should also
consider new policy options that can simultaneously save lives and oil.
More consideration of lower speed limits on two-lane rural highways9 9
and gradual increases in gasoline taxes 100 might be fruitful steps toward
this end. While gasoline prices would encourage a smaller new vehicle
fleet, they would save lives by reducing discretionary driving.101
98 NAS, supra note 16.
99 TRANSPORTAnoNRESEARCH BoARD,55: DECADE oFExPERmNCE (1984).
100 Leigh & Frank, Tax Gasoline to Save Lives, 316 N. ENG. J. MED. 54 (1987)
Leigh & Wilkinson, The Effect of Gasoline Taxes on Highway Fatalities, 10 J.
PoLy ANAL& MGMT. 474 (1991).
101 Leigh & Wilkinson, supra note 100.
